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Fuel subsidy in Nigeria: Lessons in leading the 
people’s side of the tussle
In a nutshell
Each time the Federal Government of Nigeria considers the 
burden of fuel subsidy too heavy, it attempts to shed a bit of it. 
Two things often follow: first, the prices of petroleum products 
and the cost of living instantly go up; second, the organised 
labour and civil society organisations mobilise the citizens 
for protest. They assume the leading position among citizens 
articulating citizens’ side of the tussle in the narratives. In most 
cases, these protests take place and lead to a downward 
review of the prices of petroleum products; in a few cases 
the protests barely take place. In 2012, the protests were 
widespread and led to significant policy initiatives (especially 
SURE-P). Since 2015 fuel prices have continuously gone up 
(once, down) but labour and the activists have not succeeded 
in getting people out onto the streets. In effect, they seem to 
have lost the ability and legitimacy to lead the people’s side 
of the tussle. This has negative implications for the subsidy-
related contentions that sometimes bring reprieve for citizens, 
even temporarily. In the study reported here, we examined 
how labour and others lost that role, and we draw out lessons 
on how to lead the people’s side of a volatile tussle such as 
the fuel subsidy issue. 
Year President/Head of State Change in price Remarks
1973 Yakubu Gowon 6k to 8.45k 40.8% increase
1976 Murtala Muhammed 8.45k to 9k 6.5% increase
1978 Olusegun Obasanjo 9k to 15.3k 70% increase
1982 Shehu Shagari 15.3k to 20k 30.7% increase
1986 Ibrahim Babangida 20k to 39.5k 97.5% increase
1988 Ibrahim Babangida 39.5k to 42k 6.3% increase
1989 Ibrahim Babangida 42k to 60k 42.9% increase
1991 Ibrahim Babangida 60k to70k 16.7% increase
1993 Ernest Shonekan 70k to N5 614.3% increase
1993 Sani Abacha N5 to N3.25k 35% decrease
1994 Sani Abacha N3.25k to N15 361.5% increase
1994 Sani Abacha N15 to N11 26.67% decrease
1998 Abdusalami Abubakar N11 toN25 127.3% increase
1999 Abdulsalami Abubakar N25 to N20 25% decrease
2000 Olusegun Obasanjo N20 to N30 50% increase
2000 Olusegun Obasanjo N30 to N22 26.7% decrease after protests
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From 13 Focus Group Discussions involving those who 
did protest and those who did not, fifteen key-informant 
interviews with labour leaders, activists and government 
officials, we identified reasons for (not) participating in fuel-
related protests, leadership tactics of the protest leaders, 
and government’s responses to the protests.
Findings: Trust, distrust 
and vanishing legitimacy
Trust and distrust played a major role in the protests, their 
intensity and the role of leaders of the citizens’ end of the 
tussle.
The 2012 had widespread and sharp bite and presence 
because the government had lost the trust of the people: it 
was enmeshed in corruption allegations of unimaginable 
proportions, just as the then president was perceived as 
indecisive. A discussant said:
At the same time, labour leaders enjoyed a high level of credibility, 
and the opposition was not just organised, it was credible and 
had a large following.
Therefore, when government announced the increase in the 
pump price of petrol from N65 to N141, there was a waiting 
and credible leadership to mobilise the citizens.
2002 Olusegun Obasanjo N22 to N26 18.2% increase
2003 Olusegun Obasanjo N26 to N42 61.5% increase
2004 Olusegun Obasanjo N42 to N50 19.1% increase
2004 Olusegun Obasanjo N50 to N65 30% increase
2007 Olusegun Obasanjo N65 to N75 15.4% increase
2007 Umar Yar’ Adua Back to N65 15.4% decrease without protests
2012 Goodluck Jonathan N65 to N141 116.92% increase
2012 Goodluck Jonathan N141 to N97 31.2% decrease after protests
2015 Goodluck Jonathan N97 to N87 10.31% decrease as election approached
2016 Muhammadu Buhari N87 to N145 66.67% increase
2020 Muhammadu Buhari N145 to N124 14.5% decrease (market forces)
2020 Muhammadu Buhari N124 to N123 0.81% decrease (market forces)
2020 Muhammadu Buhari N123 to band of N140 - N145 (Partial) market forces
2020 Muhammadu Buhari Band of N140 - N145 to band 
of N145 - N148
(Partial) market forces
2020 Muhammadu Buhari Band of 145-148 to price cap 
of N151
(Partial) market forces
2021 (Feb) Muhammadu Buhari Band of N160 to N167 (Partial) market forces





















It was too obvious that Nigeria could afford subsidy; 
too obvious. But the money for subsidy was being 
stolen right in front of the President. The solution was 
not to withdraw subsidy, and make we masses suffer; 
the solution was to stop corruption. That’s why we 
have that poster [placard] that said “Kill corruption, 
don’t kill Nigerians”
The Study
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In 2016, the case was different. When the prices of petrol 
went up by over 66%, top among the reasons for not 
participating in protest called by labour was lack of trust for 
labour leaders and a feeling of betrayal. Describing Labour’s 
handling of the 2012 protests, a discussant said:
Even government officials interviewed affirmed the opacity 
with which labour conducted the 2012 negotiations stating 
that that explained people’s reluctance to protest future fuel 
increase.
Distrust for labour leaders and CSOs was coupled with the 
reputation for integrity and honesty that the president brought 
into government a year before the protest, a reputation that 
made many to believe that if the president said subsidy 
removal was the best for the nation, then it must be. Why 
then protest?
In 2020, the government decided that it would boldly remove 
subsidy once and for all time. This meant that the pump 
price of fuel would be determined by international oil market 
forces though with a cap to be ensured by government. 
Immediately the pump price of a litre of petrol dropped from 
N145 to N124, and further to N123. However, as global 
prices rose, it also rose first to N145, and later to a range of 
between N145 and N161. About the same time, government 
permitted an upward review of the cost of electricity. 
Labour jumped in to rally citizens for protests. As the ultimatum 
drew to a close, it was clear that Nigerians would, again, not 
protest this time. Labour quickly entered into negotiations 
with government and the ultimatum was extended by some 
weeks.
Nigerians had learnt to trust neither the organised labour 
nor the government. In the assessments of our focus group 
discussants, government had failed in many of its promises 
especially those about security, electricity and the resuscitation 
of the refineries. Labour leaders were also accused of being 
the major beneficiaries of most popular actions in addition to 
being corrupted by government. Thus, they were distrusted. 
Beyond condemning government’s decisions in the media 
and through online platforms, opposition politicians could 
not, unlike in 2012, rally people for a protest in 2020. Again, 
they are as distrusted as the government and labour leaders.
The foregoing abridged analysis suggests that when 
Nigerians trust labour leaders and protest organisers and 
distrust the government, a strong protest could occur; when 
they trust the president but not the labour leaders and protest 
organisers, only a lame protest could be expected; when they 
trust neither of them one might expect close to no protests 
at all.
Lessons on leading the 
people’s end of the tussle 
Transparency should be first guiding 
principle
Citizens possess the critical faculty which predisposes them to 
doubt and distrust. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the 
level of distrust is often high because people think that they 
have been let down innumerable times by their government. 
Only a transparent leadership can serve the people in this 
situation and remain trusted.
Inclusiveness should be second guiding 
principle
Mobilising and including everyone during protests but self-
selecting by labour leaders during negotiations is a major 
cause of distrust and opacity. If protest leaders are not 
inclusive in constituting their negotiation team, government 
should insist on inclusiveness because it is actually in the 
interest of every stakeholder.
Leaders should nurture structures and 
seek quick exit
Good leadership helps people take control so well that the 
leaders become unnecessary. It does not nurture a culture of 
dependency in which the people have to call on the union 
leaders and CSOs each time a threat to their wellbeing 
arises.
Mass action is an expendable resource
People protesting on the streets and at barricades might be 
singing, dancing, and sharing food, drinks and jokes but that 
does not make protesting endless fun. This is especially so in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings where protests are met 
with maximum force from security agencies, leading to injury 
and loss of lives.
Why bother?
Civil society organisations, organised labour, 
international development partners and especially the 
government should be bothered about the gradual 
disappearance of the legitimacy of the leaders of the 
citizens’ end of discourses and protests in Nigeria. 
The October 2020 #EndSARS transmuted into an 
orgy of violence, looting and bloodletting most likely 
because it was leaderless. Not only this, without 
credible leadership of the citizens’ movements and 
actions, the nation would be robbed of balanced 
contentions on which democracy is known to thrive.
When it is time to protest, they will call us out into the 
sun; when it is time to negotiate with government they 
say we are not part of organised labour. Labour goes in 
and dine and wine with government. They come out 
smiling and we are  still suffering.
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